2. Reasons on the Part of the Presence of the Object

366. From the second membera [n.351], namely from the presence of the object, is proof given for the first consequence [n.349]. First as follows: Either the intellect can have an object present to it in idea of intelligible object without the fact it is to any inferior power, or it cannot. If it cannot, then, it cannot have any operation without the inferior powers (because it cannot have an object present without them), and if it cannot have an operation without them, then it cannot be without them, according to the Philosopher in his preface to On the Soul [1.1.403a3-10]. But if it can have an object present without the object’s presence to an inferior power, then it has [sc. an operation without the inferior powers]. The proof of the consequence is that the agents of such presence of the object, namely the phantasm and the agent intellect, are close enough to the possible intellect, and they act by way of nature and so they necessarily cause in it that of which it is itself receptive.b

a.a [Note by Scotus] The second way [n.349], three reasons against Henry; note the first with the third.

b.b [Interpolated text; cf. Rep. IA d.3 n.107] Now the intellect, as it is distinguished from the sensitive part, can have an object present in its proper presentiality or it cannot. If it can, the intended conclusion is gained, that the object is not present in abstractive cognition before an elicited act is save through some representative that I call a species. If it cannot, then it cannot have any operation proper to itself without the sensitive part, and consequently neither can it be without it, according to the argument of the Philosopher On the Soul 1 [n.366], “if the intellect cannot have an operation proper to itself, it cannot be separated;” and so it could not have an operation proper to itself in which it would not depend on the sensitive part.

367. Second as follows: the other cognitive powers have an object present to them, not merely secondarily (namely because these objects are present to other inferior powers), but in its proper presentiality, just as the common sense has color present to it, not only insofar as color is present to sight, but because it has the species of color present in the organ of the common sense. Therefore, since this is a mark of perfection in the cognitive power (to have an object present to it under the idea in which it is an object of this sort of power), it follows that not only can this power have an object present to it because it is present to the imaginative power, but can have it in its proper presentiality, insofar, of course, as it shines forth for the intellect through something that is in the intellect.

368. Again third; if a power, which is not able to have an act save about an object present to it, cannot have that object present save through another power with which it is contingently conjoined, it depends in its operation on such power as is contingently conjoined with it, and so it is imperfect. But the intellect cannot have an act save about an object present to it and, for you, it cannot have an object present save in the virtue of imagination [n.340]. But the virtue of imagination is contingently conjoined to the intellect insofar as it is a power;     therefore , the intellect in its operation depends on another power that is contingently conjoined with it, and so this puts an imperfection of cognitive power in it [cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 4 q.7]; but no imperfection is to be posited in any nature unless a necessity appear in such nature; therefore such imperfection is not to be posited in the intellect.

369. If you object that plurality is only to be posited where there is necessity, here there is no necessity, therefore etc     . - I reply: there is necessity when the perfection of nature requires it. Now although the supposit that a man is can have, because he is a man, an object present to him in the phantasm, yet the intellectual nature of man, as it is intellectual, does not have an object sufficiently present to it if it has it only in a presence begged from the imaginative power. This therefore much cheapens intellective nature as it is intellective, because that is removed from it which is a mark of perfection in a cognitive power, and which is found in the sensitive power, as in the imaginative power. Therefore, plurality is being posited here on account of necessity, because on account of saving the perfection of a more perfect nature, a perfection which is greater than that of a more imperfect nature, or at least equal to it.